Abstract: We consider a general, stable nonlinear dynamic system with N inputs and N outputs, where in the steady state, the output signals represent the non-quadratic payoff functions of a noncooperative game played by the values of the input signals. We introduce a non-model based approach for locally stable convergence to a steady-state Nash equilibrium. In classical game theory algorithms, each player employs the knowledge of the functional form of its payoff and of the other players' actions, whereas in the proposed algorithm, the players need to measure only their own payoff values. This strategy is based on the so-called "extremum seeking" approach, which has previously been developed for standard optimization problems and employs sinusoidal perturbations to estimate the gradient. Since non-quadratic payoffs create the possibility of multiple, isolated Nash equilibria, our convergence results are local. Specifically, the attainment of any particular Nash equilibrium is assured only for initial conditions in a set around that specific stable Nash equilibrium. Moreover, for non-quadratic payoffs, the convergence to a Nash equilibrium is biased in proportion to the perturbation amplitudes and the payoff functions' third derivatives. We quantify the size of these residual biases.
INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of solving noncooperative games with N players in real time by employing a non-model based approach, which extends the methods of extremum seeking (Ariyur and Krstic [2003] , Tan et al. [2006] , Luo and Schuster [2009] , Moase et al. [2009] , ), originally developed for standard optimization problems. The players' actions are the inputs to a general, stable nonlinear dynamic system, whose outputs are the players' payoff values. By utilizing extremum seeking with sinusoidal perturbations, the players achieve local attainment of their Nash strategies without the need for any model information. We analyze games where the dynamic system acts on a faster time scale compared to the time scale of the players' strategies and where the players have non-quadratic payoff functions, which may result in multiple, isolated Nash equilibria. We study the effect of these non-quadratic functions on the players' convergence to the Nash equilibria.
Most algorithms designed to achieve convergence to Nash equilibria require modeling information for the game and assume that the players can observe the actions of the other players. A strategy known as fictitious play is one such strategy (employed in finite games) that depends on the actions of the other players so that a player can devise ⋆ This research was made with Government support under and awarded by DoD, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellowship, 32 CFR 168a and by grants from the National Science Foundation, AFOSR and DOE. a best response. A dynamic version of fictitious play and gradient response, which also includes an entropy term, is developed in Shamma and Arslan [2005] and is shown to converge to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in cases that previously did not converge. Distributed iterative algorithms are designed for the computation of equilibria in Li and Başar [1987] for a general class of non-quadratic convex Nash games. In Zhu and Martínez [2010] , a synchronous distributed learning algorithm, where players remember their own actions and utility values from the previous two times steps, is shown to converge in probability to the set of restricted Nash equilibria. An approach, which is similar to our Nash seeking method found in this paper (and in our earlier works, and ), is studied in to solve coordination problems in mobile sensor networks. Other diverse engineering applications of game theory include the design of communication networks (MacKenzie and Wicker [2001] , Altman et al. [2002] , Başar [2007] , Scutari et al. [2009] ), integrated structures and controls (Rao et al. [1988] ), and distributed consensus protocols (Bauso et al. [2008] , Marden et al. [2009], Semsar-Kazerooni and Khorasani [2009] ). A comprehensive treatment of static and dynamic noncooperative game theory can be found in Başar and Olsder [1999] .
In this work, N players in a noncooperative game that has a dynamic mapping from the players' actions to their payoff values employ an extremum seeking strategy to stably attain a Nash equilibrium. The key feature of our approach is that the players are not required to know the mathematical model of their payoff function or the underlying model of the game. The players only need to measure their own payoff values. The players' payoff functions are non-quadratic, which allows for the possibility of multiple, isolated Nash equilibria. The convergence result is local in the sense that convergence to any particular Nash equilibrium is assured only for initial conditions in a set around that specific stable Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this convergence is biased in proportion to the perturbation amplitudes and the payoff functions' third derivatives.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a noncooperative game with N players and a dynamic mapping from the players' actions u i and their payoff values J i , which the players wish to maximize. Specifically, we consider a general nonlinear model,
where x ∈ R n is the state, u ∈ R N is a vector of the players' actions, J i ∈ R is the payoff value of player i, and f : R n × R N → R n and h i : R n → R are smooth.
We make the following assumptions about the N -player game: Assumption 1. There exists a smooth function l :
Assumption 2. For each u ∈ R N , the equilibrium x = l(u) of the system (1) is locally exponentially stable.
Hence, we assume that for any action by the players, the nonlinear dynamic system is locally exponentially stable. We can relax the requirement that this assumption hold for each u ∈ R N as we need to only be concerned with the action sets of the players, namely, u ∈ U ⊆ R N .
The following assumptions are central to our Nash seeking scheme as they ensure that at least one stable Nash equilibrium exists. Assumption 3. There exists at least one, possibly multiple, isolated stable Nash equilibria u
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, where
is diagonally dominant and hence, nonsingular.
By Assumptions 3 and 4, Λ is Hurwitz.
For this game, we seek to attain a Nash equilibrium u * stably by employing an algorithm that does not require the players to know the actions of the other players, Fig. 1 . Deterministic extremum seeking scheme employed by two players in a dynamic system with nonquadratic payoffs.
the mathematical form of the payoff functions h i , or the dynamical system f .
NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
Deterministic extremum seeking, which is a non-model based real-time optimization strategy, enables player i to attain a Nash equilibrium by evolving its action u i according to the measured value of its payoff J i . Specifically, player i implements the following Nash seeking strategy:
where µ i (t) = a i sin(ω i t+ϕ i ), and a i , k i , ω i > 0. We select the parameters k i = εωK i = O(εω) where ω = min i {ω i } and ε, ω are small, positive constants. As will be seen later, the perturbation signal gain a i must also be small. Figure 1 depicts a noncooperative game played by two players implementing the extremum seeking strategy (6) to attain a Nash equilibrium. Note how this strategy requires only the payoff value J i to be known for player i.
We denote the error relative to the Nash equilibrium as u i (t) = u i (t) − µ i (t) − u * i and formulate the error system in the time scale τ = ωt as
, and
The system (7)- (8) is in the standard singular perturbation form with ω as a small parameter. Since ε is also small, we anlayze (7)- (8) using the general averaging theory for the quasi-steady state of (7), followed by the use of the singular perturbation theory for the full system.
General Averaging Analysis
For the averaging analysis, we first "freeze" x in (7) at its quasi-steady state
and substitute (9) into (8) to obtain the "reduced system,"
This system's form allows for the use of general averaging theory (Khalil [2002] , Fink [1974] ) and leads to the result: Theorem 1. Consider the system (10) for an N -player game under Assumptions 3 and 4 and where
There exist M , m > 0 and ε,ā such that, for all ε ∈ (0,ε) and a i ∈ (0,ā), if |∆(0)| is sufficiently small, then for all τ ≥ 0,
where
and π j = 1 4
Proof We apply the general averaging theory to compute the average system of (10),
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and we postulate thatũ e has the form,
By expanding p i about u * in (14) and substituting (15), the unknown coefficients b i j and c i jk can be determined. The Taylor series expansion of p i about u * in (14) for an N -player game is
where ν i =ũ e i + µ i (τ ). Substituting (16) into (14) and computing the average of each term gives
where we have noted Assumption 3, utilized (15), and computed the average of each term, omitting the details for brevity.
Substituting (15) into (17) and matching first order powers of 
By again utilizing a Taylor series expansion, one can show that the Jacobian Ψ ave = [ψ i,j ] N ×N of (13) atũ e has elements given by
and is Hurwitz by Assumptions 3 and 4 for sufficiently small a i , which implies that the equilibrium (19) of the average system (13) is locally exponentially stable, i.e., there exist constants M , m > 0 such that |ũ ave (τ ) −ũ e | ≤ M e −mτ |ũ ave (0) −ũ e |. From general averaging theory (Khalil [2002] , Fink [1974] ), the system (10) retains the stability properties of the average system. Defining ∆(τ ) as in Theorem 1 completes the proof.
From Theorem 1, we see that the reduced system converges to a region that is biased away from the Nash equilibrium u * in proportion to the perturbation magnitudes a i and the third derivatives of the payoff functions, which are captured by the coefficients c i jj .
Singular Perturbation Analysis
We analyze the full system (7)-(8) in the time scale τ = ωt using singular perturbation theory. First, we note that by [Fink, 1974, Theorem 14 .4] and Theorem 1 there exists an exponentially stable almost periodic solutioñ
We define z i =ũ i −ũ a i and obtain
From Assumption 1, the quasi-steady state is
so the reduced model is given by
which, for sufficiently small a i , has an exponentially stable equilibrium at z = 0 as shown in Section 3.1.
To formulate the boundary layer model, let y = x − l(u * + z +ũ a + µ(τ )), and then in the time scale t = τ /ω,
where u = u * +ũ + µ(τ ) should be viewed as a parameter independent of the time variable t. Since f (l(u), u) = 0, y = 0 is an equilibrium of (26) and is exponentially stable by Assumption 2.
From the exponential stability of both the reduced model (25) and the boundary layer model (26) and from Tikhonov's Theorem on the Infinite Interval [Khalil, 2002, Theorem 11 .2], we conclude that the solutionũ(τ ) of (8) is O(ω)-close to the solution z(τ ) of (25), and it converges exponentially to the solutionũ a (t), which is O(ε)-close to the equilibriumũ e . Hence,
The solution x(τ ) of (7) satisfies
where y(t) is the solution to the boundary layer model (26), and we can write
From the convergence properties ofũ(τ ) and because y(t) is exponentially decaying, x(τ ) − l(u * ) exponentially converges to an O(ω + ε + max i a i )-neighborhood of the origin. Thus, J = h(x) exponentially converges to an
We summarize with the following theorem: Theorem 2. Consider the system (1)- (2) with (6) for an N -player game under Assumptions 1-4 and where ω i = ω j , ω i = ω j + ω k , 2ω i = ω j + ω k , and ω i = 2ω j + ω k for all distinct i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N }. There exist constants ω, ε, and a such that for all min i ω i ∈ (0, ω), ε ∈ (0, ε), and max i a i ∈ (0, a), the solution (x(t), u 1 (t), . . . , u N (t)) converges exponentially to an O(min i ω i + ε + max i a i )-neighborhood of the point (l(u * ), u * 1 , . . . , u * N ), provided the initial conditions are sufficiently close to this point.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For an example non-quadratic game with players that employ the extremum seeking strategy (6), we consider the system,ẋ
whose equilibrium state is given by (x 1 ,x 2 ) = ( + 24 + 5 32
(31) The Jacobian at the equilibrium (x 1 ,x 2 ) is
which is Hurwitz for u 2 < 16. Thus, the equilibrium (x 1 ,x 2 ) is locally exponentially stable, but not for all (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ R 2 , violating Assumption 2. This restrictive requirement of local exponential stability for all u ∈ R N was done merely for notational convenience, and we actually require this assumption to hold only for the players' action sets. In this example, we restrict the players' actions to the open set
At x =x, the payoff functions are
2 + 3u 1 u 2 , which have the associated reaction curves, defined on the action set U , shown below:
These reaction curves have two intersections in the interior of U , which correspond to two Nash equilibria: (u * 1 , u * 2 ) = (25/64, 5/8) and (v * 1 , v * 2 ) = (1/64, 1/8). At u * , Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied, implying the stability of u * , whereas at v * , these assumptions are violated-as they must be-since further analysis will show that v * is an unstable Nash equilibrium. The reaction curves also intersect on the action set boundary ∂U at (0, 0), which means this game has a Nash equilibrium on the boundary that the players may seek depending on the game's initial conditions. In this example, we are concerned only with seeking the interior Nash equilibria.
The average error system for the reduced model, which can be computed explicitly according to (13), has equilibriã
which is the smallest value ofũ e 1 for each Nash equilibrium, (ũ 
where we have omitted the dependency of δ on η * for conciseness. The second equilibrium in (34) can be disregarded since it is simply the difference between the two Nash equilibria. The postulated form (15) of (ũ 
Since only the payoff function for player 2 is non-quadratic, the average error equilibrium is biased away from l 2 but still lies on l 1 .
The Jacobian Ψ ave of the average error system for the reduced model evaluated at (ũ 
where κ 1 = εK 1 a 2 1 and κ 2 = εK 2 a 2 2 , and its characteristic equation is given by,
Thus, Ψ ave is Hurwitz if and only if ζ 1 and ζ 2 are positive. For sufficiently small a 2 (so that δ ≈ 0), ζ 1 , ζ 2 > 0 when η * = u * 2 = 5/8, and ζ 2 < 0 when η * = v * 2 = 1/8, which implies u * is a stable Nash equilibrium and v * is unstable.
For the simulations, we select k 1 = k 2 = 1.75, a 1 = 0.06, a 2 = 0.03, ω 1 = 1.2, and ω 2 = 2, where the parameters are chosen to be small, in particular the perturbation frequencies ω i , since the perturbation must occur at a time scale that is slower than the fast time scale of the nonlinear system. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the players' actionŝ u 1 andû 2 initialized at (u 1 (0), u 2 (0)) = (û 1 (0),û 2 (0)) = (0.2, 0.9) and (0.1, 0.15). The state (x 1 , x 2 ) is initialized at the origin in both cases. We showû i instead of u i to better illustrate the convergence of the players' actions to a neighborhood near-but biased away from-the Nash strategies since u i contains the additive signal µ i (t).
For both initial conditions, the average actions of both player 1 and player 2 lie below u * , which is consistent with the equilibrium (34). More specifically, we letū i denote the average action of each player at steady state and computeū i using the actions u i over the final 300 sec of each simulation, obtaining 
for the simulation with initial condition (0.2, 0.9), and similarly, Figure 3 depicts the phase portrait of the average reduced modelû-system. The initial condition (0.1, 0.15) lies near the unstable equilibrium, causing the slow initial convergence seen in Figure 2(b) . When the players' initial conditions lie in the stable region of the phase portrait, the Nash seeking algorithm converges to a neighborhood of the stable Nash equilibrium and the players' actions remain in U . In Figure 3(b) , the trajectories from the two simulations are shown with a zoomed-in area, highlighting their convergence to an almost-periodic orbit biased away from u * . The depicted orbit is approximately centered on l 1 as predicted by (34) and confirmed by (36).
The eigenvectors are, in general, neither tangent nor perpendicular to the reaction curves at the Nash equilibrium points. The phase portrait and orientation of the eigenvectors do depend on the values of a i and k i , but the stability of each Nash equilibrium is invariant to their values, provided these parameters are positive and small.
CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a non-model based approach to solve for Nash equilibria of N -player noncooperative games with dynamics. The players' payoff functions are non-quadratic, which allows for the possibility of multiple, isolated Nash equilibria. Convergence to a Nash equilibrium is achieved by a player while measuring only the value of its own payoff, but in this setting, convergence is a local result and it is biased. Even though we have considered only the case where the action variables of the players are scalars, the results equally apply to the vector case, namely u i ∈ R ni , by simply considering each different component of a player's action variable to be controlled by a different (virtual) player. The payoff functions of all virtual players corresponding to player i will be the same. shows that the players converge to an almost-periodic orbit, biased away from u * and centered on the reaction curve l 1 , with the average actions of the players marked by ×. The orbit shown consists of the last 300 sec of each trajectory.
